Abstract: This article proposes an analytical framework for thinking about violence in the Islami Jamiati-Tuleba (IJT), the student organization of Jamaat e Islami (JI), Pakistan's longstanding Islamist party. It prioritises the intersection of the psychic and the social, and the role of politics, history and biography in mediating the modalities, narration and praxis of violence in the city of Karachi. The dominant explanations tend to emphasise political instrumentalism, and structural and ideological factors, and to "Islamicise" the violence, collapsing Islamic rhetoric into an extemporization of conditions, ignoring the deep affective appeal of violence to individuals, and leaving unelaborated the role of intersecting national, local and individual contexts and temporalities in structuring political subjectivity and violent action.
This discursive article derives from fieldwork conducted in an ethnic Mohajir neighbourhood in central Karachi during several visits between 2001 and 2006 as well as prior long-term familiarity in the area. It proposes temporality and spatiality as two key ideas in a conceptualization of violence that is psychological (individual), social (local) and political (national, involving the state). It argues that the combination of life-history analysis with ethnography can capture some ways in which personal, local and national history interweave in a range of political, discursive, imaginary and affective fields. Biography is a key analytical lens for exploring ways which violence is imagined, practiced and narrativised-and a useful tool for theorising ways that personal history can constitute and construct individual agency as a narrative formation of intersecting social and political histories, dynamics, institutions and practices. It can reveal how individual and collective agendas of transformation become entangled with social and political processes during conflict, how social and political forces translate into individual and collective action in local processes of violence-as well as tensions between diverse and contradictory formations of the past and present. The relation between narrative, event and agency in biography is neither linear nor chronological. The narrator narrates from a position of already having been inscribed into powerful narrations as a historical, political and cultural subject. Making sense of these inscriptions requires that we pay attention to both psychological and social registers of different realities, without reiterating dualistic distinctions that separate off inner desires and fantasies from a real, material outer world, for example (Stenner 2010) , and see history, society and the psyche as mutually constitutive elements.
People are neither passive recipients nor mirrors of unconscious discourses, images and modes of thinking and feeling. Rather, they play an active role in shaping cultural, political and economic practices of opposition to social marginalization. Narrative plays its part as a key, purposeful tool of transformation for individuals that can shape political consciousness and transform the meaning of experience. As Freud reminds us, life is lived forwards but understood backwards; individuals aggregate past experiences in alignment with na ve present experience and concerns for self-presentation-"the present must have become the past before it can yield vantage points from which to judge the future" (Freud 1927) . Thus biography can transform suffering into new agendas for constructing (idealizing) and experiencing selfhood, as well as reflect agendas of coping with traumatic past experiences (in these cases early abandonment, killings, the violent deaths of family members, displacement), strategies for living with multiple layers of historical violence, reshaping unbearable experiences and managing experiences of suffering and healing. The narratives of the IJT militants interweave personal imaginings of power and transformation into social and political formations of violence. They rework experiences of extraordinary violence through the lens of political discourse, and violence and suffering through fantasy and imagination, asserting themselves as impressive actors on a critical political scene.
Whilst the formalised construction of biographical narrative-with its focus on structure and events-may gloss over the more subtle ways suffering is expressed, the narrativisation of violence can become a central object of political agency and subjectivity that is directed towards resolving the embodied effects and affects of traumatic experiences, and the tensions between phenomenal and ideological time. For Das, the simultaneity of events occurring at the level of phenomenal time which are far apart in physical time makes the whole of the past simultaneously available for deployment as a lethal component in the phenomenology of violence (2007, 97) . Her work is compelling in tracing multiple forms of violence and time in the affective contours of people's lifeworlds, in raising the notion of "repetition" and of intersecting homologies of violence. That is, how narratives and experiences of repeated violence (which may involve both personal and political generations) furnish the present with coherence as well as generating difference in time and space. In this process, whilst violence might respond to unemployment, exclusion, electoral manipulations-and the symbolic and ideological formulation of these issues as grievance or injustice in Islamist political culture, "motivations" may be unimportant. Motivations may become crystallised into intention but they are also inexplicit, unconscious, unclear and unintentional. Violence may be an exhilarating, excessive end in itself, or expressive of a psychical reality that is infused not with motivation (intention) but with fundamental lack of meaning or lucidity to its perpetrators. These aspects, less sharply-defined or easily "got at" point to disjunctures between event, self and narration, and objective, phenomenal and personal time.
JI in Pakistan
JI is intrinsic to historical formations of the amalgam of state-nationalism and religion that has shaped Pakistan's inception as an Islamic republic, its three wars with India, its interests in promoting US alliances in the Soviet-Afghan War-presented to citizens as a "jihad against the infidel"-and ethnic and sectarian conflicts at home. This amalgam has inscribed symbolic continuity and repetition into versions of national history that glorify violent sacrifice, martyrdom and the removal of Islam's oppressors from power, characteristics which arguably typify political Islam in South Asia (Ahmed 1993) . Analyses of Islamist violence have prioritised the role of Pakistan's Inter-Services-Intelligence agency in promoting religious-rightist groups, the incorporation of domestic governance into US foreign policy (Grare 2006) , the regional economic imperatives of energy resources (Rashid 2001 ) and Islam's encounter with globalization in a clash of civilizations (Ahmed 2007) . One corollary of the instrumentalism of Islam as a tool of political legitimacy by political leaders is that violence is viewed through the exaggerated prism of Islamic ideology in theory and public-political culture. Moreover, the discourse of Islamic terrorism has enabled a redefinition of violence regarding the way political power is implemented and everyday life can be governed in relation to terror, and contributed to the (re)development of authoritarian practices designed to counter terror. Grare (2006) argues that whilst the Pakistani state actively sponsors and creates the threat of Islamic terrorism to justify the need for continued financial assistance and capital by foreign allies, it also uses this threat to create fears of the violent Islamist backlash that might ensue from interfering too zealously. The metaphorical impact of these approaches tends to collapse Islamic rhetoric into an extemporization of conditions ("deprivation", "ideology") that may not equal motivations, to ignore the deep affective positive appeal of violence to individuals-and to obscure other political topographical influences on violence, peace.
First, theology is neither imposed nor practiced abstractly in societies. The tendency of analysts to make painstaking distinctions between theological schools (Moussalli 2009) fails to account for the ignorance of many people of theology and ideology, and ways radical Islamist fighters in Pakistan have mobilized around diverse causes of jihadism, blending contradictory theological and political Islamic disciplines into the Muslim world's confrontations with the US and opposition to Western-allied regimes (ironically, many Pakistani groups that fought in Afghanistan were provided sophisticated weaponry by the US and supported by the US-allied state).
Second, the "Islamist confrontation of modernity" thesis revolves around the essentialising assumption that modernity involves secularization, consumerism, individualism and Westernism-in opposition to which Islamism is cast as representing a cultural, political or economic resistance that is not modern at all, or else selectively or "alternatively" modern (Salvatore 2001). The idea that modern socioeconomic and political problems can be solved by incorporating Islam into democratic politics, or reverting to a pristine Islam, ignores how the Islamist confrontation of modernity in fact concerns modern politics. Arising out of the historical milieu of Indian colonial electoral politics and modern state-formation JI is a distinctly modern development (Ahmad 2009 ).
Third, is the local dimension. JI is intrinsic to formations of Mohajir ethnicity, the Urduspeaking Indian Muslim migrants to Pakistan (principally Karachi) following Partition. JI began as a Mohajir party, appealing more conservatively to Islamist state-nationalism than religious radicalism. However, JI's failure to accommodate troubled Mohajir realities after Independence led to its decline. After the mid-eighties many Mohajir youth joined the nationalist MQM party 1 , reflecting political generational differences amongst Mohajir communities. Subsequently Karachi became factionalised by political conflicts involving MQM, the state and virtually all political groups. MQM/JI rivalries culminated in the late eighties in deadly armed clashes at Karachi University. Outside of its Karachi constituency, JI/IJT activists have also been significant players in Pakistan's history of Sunni/Shi'a sectarianism and widely perceived as the sponsors of Hekmatyar in Afghanistan. After the Taliban captured Kabul (1996) , JI increased support for Pakistan Taliban groups. Recently these have enfolded elements of Hizb-i-Islami al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Although JI's religious enmities predominantly enfold territorial and economic "imperialist" threats to Pakistani sovereignty-following the US bombings of Afghanistan and now Pakistan-many theological and political differences have been lost in the widespread mobilization of Pakistani youth to anti-American jihadist groups.
In Karachi's Mohajir communities, JI's Islamism is a facet of political ideology, political generational difference, and the party's relative positioning to the state, to city politics and demography. In many neighbourhoods kinship, ethnic, communal and personal ties are prioritized. MQM and JI families intermarry, brothers support different parties, childhood friends share congenial experiences and networks. Longstanding community alliances, structures and histories of tradition and convenience complexify political allegiances beyond their representation at city and national levels. For example Irfan, following his brothers, joined the IJT. Nisar, Ahmed and Idris joined MQM. Shahid's experience of being beaten by his "Jamaati" brother suggests some switched allegiances to assert independence within their family. Others refrained; Jamal joined the police. These friends co-operated in defending their locale from ethnic attacks. Irfan even introduced his "MQM" friends to an armstrader contact. Far from maintaining political rivalries, the friends hung out together and were partners-in-crime in purchasing illegal alcohol and stealing lambs from the riverbank, excellent ingredients for a party.
Whilst such a focus in situ is compelling, and violence may respond to poverty and exclusion in urban deprived neighbourhoods, and be contingent, violence is also particularistic and individual, and its actualization dependent on the interaction of biographic meaning and heterogeneous (political, family, local) historical conditions.
Psychosocial Time
Pakistan's political history has led to the construction of continuity in an Islamist political culture that is animated by suffering, violence and trauma as its object. These representations link disjunctive historical periods and events, and reveal how violence is experienced and prosecuted from different positionalities. In this process, chronological continuity is secondary to the power of claims about religious identity to outline shared objectives, rationalise violence and shape political subjectivities and action around notions of self-sacrifice, self-defence and violent reparation.
Freud of course is a key thinker in terms of how memories of the traumatic past insinuate themselves (unbidden) into the present. In his theorization of the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (of which any comprehensive review is beyond my scope here) his emphasis is on the destructive force imposed on the human psyche by the violence of history, and on a formulation of history as an endless repetition of previous violence. It is traumatic repetition (more than the distortions of neurosis) which defines the shape of human lives. In her consideration of Freud's ideas on violence and time, Caruth (1993) proposes that the problem of trauma is more than a problem of destructive psychic experience but also, paradoxically, an enigma of survival. Trauma acquires its historical structure within the destructive force of a past event but also by its ongoing survival into the future where it defines it repeats itself through attempts to master an awakening to life. Concerning violence, trauma describes a tension between destruction and survival that expresses a legacy of fundamental "incomprehensibility" at the heart of catastrophic experience, one which the sufferer is doomed to repeat through cumulative engagements with violence.
Freud is persuasive regarding how early traumatic experience may attract and incite particular individuals to violence and on the central force of affect (trauma) in social life. Whilst his view bears on a "demotivated" psychosocial approach, he leaves the specific details of the pathway between psyche and culture or society relatively unelaborated. It is inevitable that through discourses and narratives, traumatic memories do become publicly articulated as collective experience, forging the moral presence of the past into the present and future. In rethinking these psycho-social dynamics of violence, how society and psyche interact in attracting individuals to violence, or how witnesses of violence might (violently) cope with trauma following their exposure to violence, I am initially drawn to a Kleinian framework with its more social emphasis on projective identification, the idealization of good objects and Otherness in object relations, particularly in relation to theories of aggression. Unlike Freud, who views aggression as an innate drive needing expression and gratification, Klein (1946 Klein ( /1975 views aggression emerging from selfhood and object status in family relations.
Kleinian theorists conceptualise physical violence as an extreme expression of individual aggression and as primarily constituting a reactive defence against an endangered self. This approach shifts towards the social environments that engender aggression, namely family pathology and early deprivation and gives importance to the affective experiences underlying aggression, for example anxiety, empathic failure or the fear of impingement or self-fragmentation. Fonagy (1995) argues that as a result of persistent physical or emotional damage or humiliation in childhood, violence may reflect a tendency for individuals to conceptualise themselves physically rather than mentally. If parental abuse occurs regularly, aggression can fuse integrally with self-expression and in severe cases, express a paranoidschizoid attempt to express a damaged self-structure. He also links paternal absence or loss in infancy to attacks on the self and others and a reduced capacity to modulate aggression, suggesting that when an adequate paternal third is unavailable, aggression may become a key way the individual can envisage himself in relation to others.
In Pakistan, disciplinarian forms of parenting and punishment are normal in many families and occur violently. Several militants describe being abused in, as children, conventional worlds of male domination-being singled out for punishment or neglect, or to be sent away. Fathers, as the enforcers of social patriarchy, assume particularistic importance in sons' trajectories into political violence. The generational dimension in regard to young radicals who have disrupted ties to repressive families, or become estranged by poverty, violence or death also involves love-for absent, distant or abusive fathers, leaders, compatriots and the cause. For Khalid, orphaned and sent to live in a madrasa, desires to identify with and gain the love and approval of a powerful patriarch were accentuated. Khalid's leader was idealized as able to provide the parental approval, (violent) identification and emotional fulfilment he lacked. These concerns took precedence over religion or ideology, about which he knew little. His leader meted out severe penalties for transgression, assigned him the task of instructing and disciplining younger members, and even arranged his marriage. Jihad was a professional service for hire. In Ibrahim's case, abandoning his lifestyle as an armed robber to become a jihadi secured the approval and love of his authoritarian father.
As the social expression of psychic selfhood-the role of identity assumes prominence in psychodynamic theories of aggression. For Erikson (1959, 40 ) ethnicity (read religious or cultural identity) is a primary motivational force for the forms of enmity that underpin contemporary violence. Identity derives from a continuous interplay between the individual and society in a process of "psychosocial relativity", between "projection" and the "real" elusive nature of historical change. Erikson gives importance to the analytical importance of language and time in, for example, the representations and distortions of ideology and communication technologies that produce enmities and identities. Representations cannot determine violence, but they reveal passions related to their position as powerful sites of contestation over the distribution of economic and political power. Thus rather than see these men as pathological, despite their strong predisposition to aggressivity, their actions I see as mediated by opportunism, the social organisation of patriarchal power, and the internalisation of religio-political prototypes of identity and alterity, which assume crucial status for mobilising violence.
Fantasy
Fantasy is a psychosocial arena which enfolds multiplicitous converging elements of time. There is a body of relevant anthropological work that extends ideas of representation and power to the role of affect and fantasy in the imagining and practice of political terror. In her work, Aretxaga (2006) argues that power relations are an integral to the affective states that underlie political imaginaries. The affective states of excitement, terror and desire that are produced out of violent encounters between "terrorists" and the state describe fantasies of power. Fantasy becomes almost deterministic, becoming in its enactment, translated into political reality and political power. Aretxaga draws on a Lacanian conceptualisation of the Real wherein fantasy (and its affects) serves to mask the Real, in the sense of the inapprehensible terror that lurks in the materiality of everyday practices and life (in Freud's terms, this would describe the irruption of the traumatic past into the present). The Real symbolises the actual traumatic political reality that hides behind the symbolic system that gives sense to the discourses and narratives of our political or social realities. When the Real surfaces-in rumours, whispers, conversations, gestures, viscera and the senses-it confronts us with an shocking, instantly recognizable but incomprehensible truth, "the unbearable lucidity of being" (2006, 128) .
Ideology and the psyche are similarly, inextricably linked in Zizek's Lacanian approach to fantasy as an ideological category. For Zizek (1994) , fantasy maintains the consistency of the subject and of group solidarity but also reveals the transgressions it endeavours to hide. In disentangling the paradox of how fantasy works with ideology to obfuscate the true horror of a situation, Zizek argues that rather than consider how fantasy works to hide the "scandal" of the Real, we should examine how fantasy creates what it purports to conceal, how the sanitised operations of fantasy produce the repressed form of reference, the scandalous. When the Real ruptures the aseptic veneer of fantasy, the hidden bursts through. This "truth" is obvious-and represents a paradox which illustrates perfectly that the unconscious is visible to everyone, not hidden in any unfathomable depths. These features Zizek brings to the notion that fantasy encourages ideology to capitalize on the enjoyment of secret, behindthe-scenes transgression. Far from being revolutionary, fantasy supports the status quo.
The IJT militants articulate their fantasies in ideological terms of desires to destroy the wholesale failures of Pakistani political democracy, neo-liberalism and US global capitalism, realise the ideal future of a truly Islamic Pakistan that can treat its citizens in accordance with its ideals, avenge the sufferings of the global community of Muslims, fulfil personal desires of becoming powerful and whole, and redeem the past through sacrifice. Yet practically, and in fantasy, in serving the state's methods of enforcing power and maintaining control, jihad structures protest conventionally rather than radically. The IJT's strategies and techniques-as with other Pakistani groups, are directed towards defending the power and interests of the state. While they promote discourses of the need to destroy the state, targeted killings reproduce the state's brutal methods of enforcing terror, maintain people's suffering and their belief in violent solutions. The violences of the past intrude into the present and future. Expressed in ideology and idealism, fantasy masks terrors of death and traumatic experience. In its enactment as fantasy, the unity of the self was most excitingly experienced through violence, which became the biggest confirmation of their existence in the moment, of being psychically alive. This raises a disturbing paradox concerning the rationality of violence to the militants' revolutionary agendas which, in Zizek's terms, is bound to erupt into consciousness. Thus, whilst some avowed killers claimed "tremendous" reputations, for others violent participation resulted in deep disappointment with their cause, an ability to conceptualise an alternative and intensified feelings of paranoia, isolation and alienation. As Qayoom, orphaned at seven and sent to live in a madrasa that trained boys for jihad expressed: "We must continue jihad but our problem is disunity. Muslims take money and work for American interests. I feel unsafe even in Pakistan. I don't know who is an American agent, a true Muslim or a Pakistani."
Conclusion
Biography and history are inseparable, mutually constitutive elements. I have proposed biography and ethnography as a way for understanding the multiplicity of (symbolic, affective, social, political) factors at play in the production of violence. These factors, peculiar to the Pakistan context, are both temporal and spatial. This approach can shed light on how people's experiences challenge distinctions made by academics between Islamic identities, and the emphasis placed on Islamist ideology in political discourse; how militants can describe an apparently total commitment to "ideological" violence, yet demonstrate an odd ignorance of Islamist political ideology; how the locale, and political, private, local and communal goals and processes shape convergences and contradictions between party goals and individual practice. Narrative is a transformative tool that can conjoin significant elements of the objective, phenomenal and time, shape political consciousness and positively transform the meaning of traumatic experience. However the paradox of violence, particularly its idealised and reproductive aspects, is that it is most effective not in endowing the present with new meaning but rather in forcing the traumatic painful past, people's struggles for survival, and their dilemmas of how to be represented and understood, into the present.
